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This study focuses on the question of rationality. Inter-
est in decision making has been preoccupying researchers 
and public from many different fields and perspectives. As-
sumptions about consumer behavior shape companies’ strat-
egy and marketing activities, laws and public policies, bank 
products, etc. It affects the society as a whole. The disci-
pline of economics largely contributed to defining (rational) 
preferences and choices of most (rational) individuals. The 
theory of rational choice has shaped classical, neoclassical, 
and mainstream economics in general. Although it has been 
widely contested, it had far-reaching effect in sociology, 
political science, philosophy, and even evolutionary theory 
(Browning, Halcli, & Webster, 1999). Since the middle of 
the 20th century, however, many premises about rational 
consumer have been shattered. The work of Simon (1955), 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974, 1981, 1983), and Kahneman 
and Tversky (1979, 1992) contributed to more real and de-
scriptive understanding of how people really reason. 
Recent economic crisis brought into light these rational-
behaving-people presumptions and gave more space to al-
ternative explanations. One of them came from the field of 
Andrijana Mušura Gabor, Zagreb School of Economics and Management, 
Jordanovac 110, 10 000 Zagreb, Croatia. E-mail: amusura@zsem.hr 
(the address for correspondence);
Lidija Gamulin, ZBInvest, Croatia.
Breaking the myth about rational investor:  
Investors’ susceptibility to heuristical and biased reasoning 
ANDRIJANA MUŠURA GABOR and LIDIJA GAMULIN
The theory of rational investors has empirically proven not to be an accurate model for describing how investors 
in reality behave. However, there is a great number of finance theorists and orthodox economists that advocate the 
theory of homo economicus. In this paper, we take closer look at susceptibility of investors to heuristics and biases 
in general, and look at some individual differences with respect to committing to these biases. Individual differ-
ences include educational background, professional experience, and years of investing experience. We found that 
susceptiveness to heuristics and biases is present in majority of hypothetical scenarios. With regard to individual 
differences, we found that educational background can play a role in susceptiveness to heuristics and biases.
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behavioral economics and behavioral finance. These disci-
plines explain how human emotional and cognitive system 
shape economic reasoning and economic decision making. 
Relevant findings from these fields point to systematic bi-
ases in decision making. It seems that people are hardwired 
to make certain errors in judgment, to make irrational deci-
sions under the influence of emotions, and to use heuristics 
to make judgments faster and efficiently but not necessar-
ily correct ones. Taking that into account, our motivation 
behind this research is to explore the degree to which the 
investors are susceptible to different biases and heuristics. 
Also, we want to examine if there are sources of individual 
differences that predispose some investors to reason more 
rationally vs. heuristically. To determine the degree of heu-
ristic reasoning, we will use hypothetical decision mak-
ing situations taken from original papers (Hardman, 2009; 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, 1992; Barber & Odean, 2006; 
Pompian, 2006; Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1998; Thaler 
& Johnson, 1990; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, 1983). In-
dividual differences include different characteristics that 
describe investors’ activities and experiences with capital 
markets. 
Background theory and hypothesis development 
The way people think, make decisions, and how they 
behave are central questions of two big social sciences – 
economics and psychology. Despite their joint object of in-
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terest, economics and psychology developed two different 
perspectives on the question how people make decisions. 
These perspectives were based in different philosophical 
and methodological grounds. The field of judgment and 
decision making is one multidisciplinary scientific field 
that has been developing rapidly from the middle of 20th 
century. On the one side, major contributions came from 
various economists, mathematicians, and statisticians, and 
on the other side, from many political and social scientists, 
philosophers, and psychologists. Two main pillars of judg-
ment and decision making field are two models of decision 
making – normative and descriptive. Normative model re-
volves around the question how people should behave in 
order to be rational (as-if models). Norms that guide rational 
behavior come in a form of axioms and theoretical assump-
tions that are tested not empirically but in a realm of logi-
cal validity. Rational axioms are based on deductive logic 
and mathematical calculations (Baron, 2004). Some of these 
axioms include completeness (having well defined prefer-
ences), transitivity (preferences are consistent), continuity 
(any separation in preference can be maintained under a 
sufficiently small deviation in probabilities), and independ-
ence (preference is independent of the possibility of another 
outcome; Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1953). Rationality, 
thus, is defined by these axioms as referent points. Most of 
today’s mainstream economic thought was founded on the 
assumptions of rational decision theory. 
While normative models deal with optimally rational 
decisions, descriptive model explores how people make 
decisions in reality and which are their actual choices. De-
scriptive model accentuate the importance of psychologi-
cal elements that influence decision making whereat human 
cognition excels as a major determinant of this process 
(Sternberg, 2004). After relevant psychological research in 
human cognition, axioms of rational decision making proved 
to be invalid because of disregarding cognitive capacities 
and lacking psychological realism. For example, research 
on framing and reversal of preferences proves that the way 
options are presented strongly influences the decision and 
thereby threatens most of von-Neumann’s axioms (Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1981). One of the founders in the decision 
making field, Herbert Simon, coined the term “bounded 
rationality” suggesting that people are not optimizers but 
satisficers – making decisions that are good enough and 
not optimal, based on one or several criteria, and needn’t 
to be optimal with respect to some particular set of prefer-
ences. Due to limited cognitive capacity and very complex 
environment, people do best within the given framework 
of available mental energy and information (Simon, 1955). 
It often means that they cannot reach the optimal choice. 
Scientific field that arose from the fields of economics and 
psychology is a new scientific discipline called behavioral 
economics. Behavioral economics emerged in opposition 
to rational economic theory and in reaction to the notion 
that “cognitive and affective states” that cannot be direct-
ly observed must be out of the field of rational economics 
(Angner & Loewenstein, 2006). More narrow definition of 
behavioral economics is the one that includes exploration of 
cognitive and emotional influences on economic decision 
making. 
Major contribution of cognitive psychology to behav-
ioral economics consists of the evidence about the mecha-
nisms of human cognition. There are two modes of thinking 
inherent to all people – automatic and controlled reason-
ing or System 1 and System 2 thinking (Kahneman, 2011). 
Automatic reasoning makes out for most of people’s daily 
thinking. Because of limited mental capacity and schematic 
structure of human knowledge, people use various mental 
shortcuts (heuristics) to make decisions under uncertain-
ty while reducing the complexity of the task of assessing 
probabilities and predicting values to simpler judgmental 
operations. Most known heuristics are availability, repre-
sentativeness, and anchoring (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; 
definitions of various heuristics can be found in the Appen-
dix A). According to Kahneman (2011), behind these heu-
ristics is automatic and low-effort System 1 thinking. It is 
responsible for making impressions, intuitions, intentions, 
and emotions. System 1, although fast, efficient, and cor-
rect most of the time, sometimes leads to systematic errors 
in judgment which can, again, lead to detrimental conse-
quences. 
Alternatively, Gigerenzer (2005, 2008) sees heuristics in 
very positive light – as adaptive mechanisms that, by em-
ploying bounded rationality, can lead to smart choices and 
better decisions. He has, following Simon’s (1955) concept 
of bounded rationality, criticized normative models as being 
ecologically invalid since criteria for evaluating behavior as 
rational or irrational don’t acknowledge the environment of 
the decision maker. Gigerenzer argues that in an environ-
ment with so much information and limited cognitive ca-
pacity for attending to them, heuristics based on one good 
reason can be as accurate as those based on many reasons. 
He even goes so far as to say that less is more, meaning that 
too much knowledge can lead to more errors and incorrect 
answers which is quite contra intuitive argument. Goldstein 
and Gigerenzer (2002) experimentally found that using heu-
ristics that rely on having little knowledge can result in fast 
and correct judgments. It is also important to mention the 
field of naturalistic decision making that combines intuition 
as part of the System 1 thinking but based in knowledge and 
mastery of the environment in which an individual is mak-
ing decisions (Klein, 2008). 
The view of “flawless” intuitive skilled judgment that 
is made automatically and in complex environments is in 
contrast to more skeptical Kahneman’s look at automatic 
thinking and expert judgment. Anyhow, both Kahneman 
and Klein came to an agreement that “the determination 
of whether intuitive judgments can be trusted requires an 
17
MUŠURA GABOR and GAMULIN, Investors’ rationality, Review of Psychology, 2016, Vol. 23, No. 1-2, 15-25
International Journal of Croatian Psychological Association published by Naklada Slap
DOI: 10.21465/rp0023.0001
examination of the environment in which the judgment is 
made and of the opportunity that the judge has had to learn 
the regularities of that environment” (Kahneman & Klein, 
2009; p. 524). In other words, experts can learn patterns and 
rules, causes and effects of certain environment only if that 
environment provides good feedback, is predictable, and 
regular. For example, activities like playing chess or practic-
ing to become a fire-fighter require that people practice and 
learn the rules in a stable and certain environment. Since 
investors are active in the environment that is irregular and 
unpredictable, we anticipate their irrationality. By irration-
ality, we consider departure from the behavior prescribed 
by rationality axioms and departure from the foundations 
of efficient market hypothesis (EMH)1. Additionally, we are 
interested in whether there are some personal characteristics 
that make investors more or less susceptible to commit er-
rors in judgment.
In the context of exploring individual differences, some 
research indicates the existence of individual factors that 
contribute to more or less heuristic/biased reasoning of in-
vestors. Hon-Snir, Kudryavstev, & Cohen (2012) found that 
more experienced investors are less affected by behavioral 
patterns in term of susceptibility to cognitive biases and 
heuristics. More experienced investors did not differ in the 
level of behavioral biases concerning their status as profes-
sional traders or non-professional traders. Experience also 
seems to be the determining factor for Anderson and Sunder 
(1995). Barber and Odean (2006) argue that professional 
investors are less prone to indulge in attention-driven pur-
chases, and with more time and resources, professionals are 
able to continuously monitor a wider range of stocks. Work-
ing to improve human reasoning, there are many studies that 
put light on a relationship between statistical (methodologi-
cal) education and better reasoning devoid of errors (Agno-
li, 1991; Cheng, Holyoak, Nisbett, & Oliver, 1986; Crandall 
& Greenfield, 1986; Fong, Krantz, & Nisbett, 1986; Nisbett, 
Fong, Lehman, & Cheng, 1987; Nisbett, Krantz, Jepson, & 
Kunda, 1983; Schaller, Asp, Rosell, & Heim, 1996). 
In present research, we will use a set of hypothetical de-
cision making scenarios as a measure of heuristical/biased 
reasoning. Results on these scenarios will be correlated with 
a group of relevant individual variables. We hypothesize 
that investors, in general, are susceptible to heuristical/bi-
ased reasoning (Hypothesis 1). Led by this expectation, we 
assume that on all or majority of scenarios we will find the 
presence of particular heuristic or bias. 
Furthermore, we expect that educational background in 
finance, professional experience with money, and years of 
experience within the market will significantly differentiate 
investors who are more and less susceptible to heuristics 
and biases (Hypothesis 2). Following the line of thought 
from previous research, we assume that investors with edu-
cational background in finance, more years of experience 
in investing, including frequency of trading as a measure of 
experience, and professional status or past experience with 




The survey was created online using QuestionPro on-
line survey software. It consisted of seven questions related 
to demographic characteristics and eight questions as indi-
cators of certain heuristics and biases. In the Appendix A 
we listed all hypothetical situations used in original studies 
or adjusted for this survey. For each situation or scenario, 
we allocated a score of 0 or 1 depending on whether the 
response indicates the heuristic/bias or not (1 for heuristi-
cal/biased response). Although each of these scenarios rep-
resents a single item, the scores were summed to form a 
composite variable. By summing up the scores, we do not 
assume that these situations have a one-dimensional latent 
structure. However, there are indications that these scenari-
os have some degree of common variance (Toplak, West, & 
Stanovich, 2011). All scenarios reflect some sort of financial 
decision making, usually gambling or investing. 
Participants and procedure
Initial list of potential participants was made out of con-
tacts available through Croatian Financial Market Associa-
tion (ACI), client base of couple of brokers associations 
and personal contacts. The list included approximately 700 
contacts. The final sample consisted of 139 valid surveys 
(20% response rate), gathered using computerized survey 
(Appendix B). All potential participants were contacted by 
e-mail, encompassed by letter explaining the purpose of 
the study. The survey was anonymous and conducted dur-
ing spring 2011. Participants were mostly male (80%), with 
age between 31 and 40 (59%) and educational background 
mostly in finance (44%; Table 1). 
1 One of the cornerstones of modern financial theory, the theory that got 
even further from the reality is EMH (Mishkin & Eakins, 2008). This 
theory, that got universally accepted, shares the same foundations as 
rational decision theory does - it states that the share prices reflect all 
the relevant information that is available to all rational investors on the 
market. Basic assumptions of EMH are that most of the investors are 
rational and they rationally evaluate financial products; if investors are 
not rational, they are not numerous and their transactions are annulated 
by the majority of rational investors. As such, EMH cannot explain the 
occurrence of market bubbles (when prices of financial products rise 
independently of fundamental values).
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RESULTS
At the beginning of our analysis, we started with de-
scriptive statistics related to each scenario that served as a 
measure of heuristical/biased reasoning (Table 2). For five 
out of eight scenarios we have found statistically significant 
difference between the frequencies of responses in the di-
rection of giving heuristical/biased response. Nevertheless, 
for two scenarios the direction of responses indicates that 
participants are by great majority giving unbiased responses 
(availability heuristic and house money effect). 
Test of intercorrelations between decision scenarios re-
vealed only one significant correlation coefficient between 
representativeness heuristic and loss aversion, r = .29, p < 
.01. All other scenario scores are unrelated. 
To test the assumption about the association between 
certain characteristics related to capital market activities 
and susceptibility to heuristics and biases, we conducted 
further correlation analyses. Since the scenarios were cate-
Table 1 
Demographic variables, categories and valid frequencies





 < 30 15 11
31-40 81 59
41-50 28 20
 > 51 14 10
Education
More finance oriented 60 44
More business oriented 23 17
Other 52 39
Professional investors status/experience
Yes (survey question 16, answers 1-7) 70 55
No (survey question 16, answers 8-10) 58 45
Years of investors experience
 < 5 (survey question 17, answers 2-3) 65 47
 > 5 (survey question 17, answer 1 ) 74 53
Frequency of investing
At least once a week 35 26
At least once a month 26 19
At least once in a three months 29 22
At least once a year 45 33
Number of stocks in portfolio
 < 3 27 20
3-10 67 49
 > 10 43 31
Table 2 




biased score Goodness-of-fit test
0 1 χ2 p
Representativeness heuristic a 55 45 1.216 .270
Loss aversion 1 a 37 63 8.813 .003
Loss aversion 2 b 32 68 18.116 .000
Mental accounting b 40 60 5.681 .017
Underreaction b 14 86 72.464 .000
Availability heuristic b 92 7 100.899 d .000
Stauts Q bias b 18 81 56.116 .000
House money effect c 82 17 58.696 d .000
Note. Significant differences are shown in boldface.
a N = 139. b N = 138. c N = 116. d Responses that indicate that participants 
are by great majority giving unbiased responses.
gorical variables and in some cases there were small number 
of participants in certain response categories, we avoided 
regression analysis. There is one significant correlation be-
tween house money effect and years of investing, r = .18, 
p < .01. The more experience in investing participants had, 
the more susceptive to house money effect they were. All 
other correlations between years of investing experience 
and heuristics/biases were insignificant. No correlation was 
found between certain heuristics/biases and frequency of in-
vesting or number of stocks in portfolio. 
Since two of our relevant questions, that were used as 
indicators of the level of participants’ capital market activi-
ties, were categorical, we used chi-square analysis to test 
whether there is a difference in frequencies in number of in-
vestors who gave heuristical/biased responses across differ-
ent categories of educational background and professional 
experience in investing (Table 3). There is a general tenden-
cy to give more heuristical/biased responses in the category 
of participants that have their education background in busi-
ness, M = 4.9, SD = 1.4. On average, those with finance 
education give less heuristical/biased answers, M = 4.3, SD 
= 1.3. This difference is statistically significant, F(1, 178) = 
6.140, p < .05. The significance levels indicate that in two 
scenarios (representativeness and mental accounting) we 
found statistically significant differences in average heuris-
tical/biased result across different educational backgrounds. 
With relation to professional experience in investing, we 
found statistically significant result in three scenarios (loss 
aversion, underreaction, and availability). There is a minor 
(insignificant) difference in tendency for participants with-
out professional experience, M = 4.3, SD = 1.2, to exhibit 
less susceptiveness to heuristics and biases in terms of aver-
age of biased scores compared to those with experience, M 
= 4.5, SD = 1.3. In three scenarios, we found different levels 
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of heuristical/biased reasoning between participants with 
and without professional experience in investing. It seems 
that the effect of professional experience in investing has no 
clear relationship with the tendency to give heuristical and 
biased answers. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
To test our first assumptions about the susceptiveness to 
various heuristics and biases, we analyzed overall tendency 
to give heuristical and biased responses. On five out of eight 
heuristics/biases, participants exhibited the existence of sus-
ceptibility to heuristics and biases. Only on two scenarios, 
the great majority of responses reside on the more rational 
side. Since the majority of scenarios revealed irrational ten-
dencies, we can conclude that our first hypothesis is mostly 
confirmed. By now, it is well known that heuristics and bias-
es help people decide and reason quickly. This tendency to 
irrationality in terms how economics defines it might be an 
indicator of pretentious assumptions that normative theory 
of rationality and EMH has put in front of a rational inves-
tor. Tendency to act not in accordance to assumptions of ra-
tional theory or EMH is one major and legitimate reason of 
market’s volatility, unpredictability, and related phenomena 
like market bubbles, etc. Furthermore, since the market is 
quite unpredictable and uncertain environment that disables 
learning of its rules, our findings can be related to Kahne-
man and Klein’s (2009) agreement on how experts learn. 
Of course, the results of this research cannot be used for 
generalization since the sample in this research is not repre-
sentative nor the hypothetical situations can be equated with 
the real life decisions.
The absence of meaningful and significant correlations 
between the hypothetical scenarios used indicates that these 
situations might not have similar or latent construct/process 
behind them. This finding discouraged us from making an 
index of heuristical/biased reasoning. However, this finding 
reflects the fact that each one of these hypothetical deci-
sion making scenarios is a story for itself, helping define a 
particular phenomenon, and is very contextual. In the new 
discipline of behavioral economics, there is still no great 
model or theory that could explain latent processes that re-
late all these phenomena except the well-known theory of 
dual processes. In the future research, there is a need for de-
veloping an instrument that could serve as a valid measure 
of tendency for heuristical/biased reasoning. 
Different categories of educational background and 
professional experience are somewhat correlated with the 
tendency of resisting some heuristics/biases. In the case of 
representativeness heuristic, availability heuristic and men-
tal accounting, participants with educational background in 
finance gave more responses that are rational. It seems that 
educational background could have some effect on suscepti-
bility to heuristical/biased reasoning. 
Professional experience in investing, moreover, does not 
seem to have a rationalizing effect on investors in our sample 
as Anderson and Sunder (1995), Barber and Odean (2006), 
and Hon-Snir et al. (2012) found in their research. Expe-
rience, in term of years spent in investing activities, does 
not differentiate investors according to their level of sus-
ceptibility to heuristics and biases. It is advisable to further 
explore how these experiential influences shape individuals’ 
rationality and the ability to resist automatic and contextual 
heuristics and biases. Anyhow, the finding about finance 
education that could lead to greater rationality is worth ex-
ploring. There is a line of research that is focused on the cor-
relation between education in economics and tendency to be 
more rational, selfish, and less prone to cooperation (James, 
Soroka, & Benjafield, 2001; Lanteri, 2008; Zhou, 2010). 
This line of research is mostly correlational in nature. There 
are some research that suggest that learning finance helps 
reduce some biases (Greenberg & Shtudiner, 2016; Lahav, 
Rosenboim, & Shavit, 2015; Shavit, Lahav, & Rosenboim, 
2016). Education in finance is more focused on quantitative 
Table 3 
Chi-square tests (df = 2) for the frequency of investors who gave heuristical/biased answers across different educational backgrounds and professional 
experience in investing
Heuristics/Biases
Educational background Professional experience
Finance Business χ2 p Yes No χ2 p
Representativeness heuristic 35 (56%) 18 (82%) 4.791 .039 43 (57%) 26 (49%) 0.856 .355
Loss aversion 1 43 (67%) 18 (82%) 1.700 .192 54 (72%) 32 (60%) 1.903 .168
Loss aversion 2 46 (72%) 16 (73%) 0.006 .939 58 (77%) 31 (57%) 5.827 .016
Mental accounting 33 (52%) 17 (77%) 4.171 .041 44 (59%) 37 (70%) 1.660 .198
Underreaction 57 (91%) 18 (82%) 0.177 .278 67 (89%) 37 (70%) 7.769 .005
Availability heuristic 3 (5%) 2 (9%) 0.580 .466 3 (4%) 9 (17%) 6.096 .014
Status Q bias 50 (80%) 18 (82%) 0.061 .804 61 (81%) 45 (85%) 0.278 .598
House money fallacy 9 (14%) 7 (18%) 0.191 .662 13 (17%) 10 (19%) 0.066 .797
Note. Significant differences are shown in boldface.
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knowledge, which could have more rationalizing impact on 
reasoning. Yet, individuals who are attracted to the field of 
finance could already be more rational. Nevertheless, since 
there are no correlations between the scenarios, it is hard to 
give any conclusion or assumption related to this finding. 
Overall, it seems that educational background has a po-
tential to be a relevant individual variable that might dif-
ferentiate investors by their level of rationality. Thus, we 
only partially confirmed our second hypothesis. These find-
ings may serve as a tool for deepening our understanding of 
the effects of education on susceptibility to automatically 
generated reasoning errors and be useful information for fi-
nancial companies’ managers. Additionally, these findings 
are aligned with descriptive decision making theories that 
help reveal real human behavior within its environment. It is 
necessary to note that the real effects of investors reasoning 
need to be examined within the markets or using comput-
erized simulations that have higher levels of psychological 
realism. Since there are no consistent findings with regards 
to investors individual differences and reasoning, findings 
from this study may be indicative and suggest a path for 
further research. Additional advantage of this study is that 
it is conducted on real investors instead of a student sample 
as is used in most judgment and decision making research. 
Limitations of this study include non-probabilistic and 
relatively small sample of investors. For further research, 
it is advisable to analyze closely the relationships between 
various individual characteristics on a larger and more rep-
resentative sample of investors. Also, there is a research gap 
related to questioning latent processes or factors that can be 
responsible for susceptibility to different kinds of heuristics. 
For now, methodology used for exploring heuristics and bi-
ases is mostly based on hypothetical and thus idiosyncratic 
situations that show small or non-existing intercorrelations 
with other similar situations or heuristics. 
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APPENDIX A
Hypothetical decision situations indicating various heuristics and biases 
Cognitive heuristic 
/ bias
Definition Hypothetical situation (Italicized answers are indices of 




Probabilities are evaluated by the 
degree to which A is representative of 
B, that is, by the degree to which A 
resembles B (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1983) 
Assume that during five coin tosses, every time you get a 




I have no preference (0 points)
Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, 
1983
Loss aversion (1) Preference where an individual is loss 
averse if she or he dislikes symmetric 
50-50 bets and, moreover, the aversive-
ness to such bets increases with the 
absolute size of the stakes (Kahneman 
& Tversky, 1979)
Choose one of the two options offered:
Sure loss of 6,000 kn (0 points)
Having 75% chance to lose 10,000 kn and 25% to lose 
nothing (1 point)
Adapted from various 
studies. Similar situations 
can be found in Hardman 
(2009), Pompian (2006), and 
Kahneman & Tversky (1979, 
1992). 
Loss aversion (2) The set of cognitive operations used by 
individuals and households to organize, 
evaluate, and keep track of financial 
activities (Thaler, 1999) 
You’ve just lost 3,000 kn. Choose one of the two options 
offered:
33% chance to earn 3,000 kn and 67% to earn 0 kn  
(0 points)
Safe earning of 1,000 kn (1 point)
Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; 
Shefrin & Statman, 1958
Mental accounting 
(disposition effect) 
Imagine if you bought a stock A of value 20,000 kn and a 
stock B of the same value. Soon the stock A´ s value in-
creases by 10%, while the value of a stock B falls by 10%. 





Bias when limited attention leads to 
underreaction to the absence of news, 
which, by definition, is less salient and 
vivid than the events covered by news 
stories (Slovic, Fischhoff, & Lichten-
stein, 1979). 
If you read the news that could have negative implica-
tions on the price of your stock, how fast would you have 
reacted to this information?
I usually wait to see how the market will interpret the im-
portance of the news, and only after that I’ll make decision 
(1 point)
Sometimes I wait for the markets reaction, and sometimes I 
react immediately (1 point)





Mental shortcut by which people 
assess the frequency of a class or the 
probability of an event by the ease with 
which instances or occurrences can be 
brought to mind (Tversky & Kahne-
man, 1983)
Suppose you are planning to purchase stocks of the 
pharmaceutical company A. A friend sends you a report of 
the company, the investment story sounds good, you plan 
to buy its stocks. Just before your transaction, a financial 
source announces that another pharmaceutical company B 
just announced excellent financial results and that the share 
price jumped 10% in one day with high volume. You will 
react as follows:
Information about the company B will increase my belief 
in the pharmaceutical sector as a good Investment and I 
will continue to purchase stocks of Company A (0 points)
I’ll wait a bit and look for company report for Company B 
before proceeding to purchasing of stocks of company A 
(0 points)
I prefer to buy shares of company B because it seems that 
she is currently a hot stock, and therefore I want to be “in” 
(1 point)
Barber & Odean, 2006
23
MUŠURA GABOR and GAMULIN, Investors’ rationality, Review of Psychology, 2016, Vol. 23, No. 1-2, 15-25
International Journal of Croatian Psychological Association published by Naklada Slap
DOI: 10.21465/rp0023.0001
Status quo Tendency to maintain one’s current 
or previous decision (Samuelson & 
Zeckhauser, 1998)
You dedicatedly follow events in the financial markets, but 
until recently you didn’t have funds for investment. Now 
you inherited a large sum of money. Considerable part 
of the portfolio is invested in moderately risky portfolio. 
Considering four different portfolios, in which one would 
you invest?
Invest in a moderately risky stock portfolio (1 point)
Invest in a risky stock portfolio (0 points)
Invest in treasury bills (during the year, they will yield 4%) 
(0 points)
Invest in bonds (during the year, they will yield 6%) (0 
points)
Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 
1998
House money Tendency to make decisions depend-
ant on the prior gain or loss; includes 
greater tendency to gamble with re-
cently won money (Thaler & Johnson, 
1990)
(1) You have just received an unexpected 3,000 kn. Choose 
one of the two options offered:
50% chance to earn 900 kn and a 50% chance to lose 900 
kn
I do not want further gains or losses 
(2) You’ve just lost 3,000 kn. Choose one of the two op-
tions offered:
50% chance to earn 900 kn and a 50% chance to lose 900 
kn
I do not want further gains or losses 
(If participant first gave response “a” than “b”, the score 
was 1, otherwise, 0)
Thaler & Johnson, 1990
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Please take your time and fill-out this survey to the best of your ability. Read carefully the descriptions of hypothetical situ-
ations and mark (one) your answer. Your answers will be completely anonymous. All survey results will be used in scientific 
purposes. Thank you for your time and participation!




 c. I have no preference
Imagine if you bought a stock A of value is 20,000 kn and a stock B of the same value. Soon the stock A´ s value increases by 
10%, while the value of a stock B falls by 10%. You need cash urgently, which stock will you sell?
 a. A
 b. B
If you read the news that could have negative implications on the price of your stock, how fast would you react to this infor-
mation?
 a. I usually wait to see how the market will interpret the importance of the news, and only after that I make decision
 b. Sometimes I wait for market reaction, and sometimes I react immediately
 c I always react immediately (as soon as I find out the news)
Suppose you are planning to purchase stocks of the pharmaceutical company A. A friend sends you a report of the company, 
the investment story sounds good, you plan to buy its stocks. Just before transaction, a financial website announces that an-
other pharmaceutical company B just announced excellent financial results and that the share price jumped 10% in one day 
with high volume. You will react as follows:
 a. Information about the company B will increase my belief in the pharmaceutical sector as a good investment and I will 
  continue to purchase stocks of Company A
 b. I’ll wait a bit and look for company report for Company B before proceeding to purchasing of stocks of company A
 c. I prefer to buy shares of company B because it seems that she is currently a hot stock, and therefore I want to be “in”
You dedicatedly follow events in the financial markets, but until recently you did not have the funds for investment. Now you 
inherited a large sum of money. Considering four different portfolios, in which to invest?
 a. invest in a moderately risky stock portfolio
 b. invest in a risky stock portfolio
 c. invest in treasury bills (during the year, they will yield 4%)
 d. invest in bonds (during the year, they will yield 6%)
You have just received an unexpected kn 3000. Choose one of the two options offered:
 a. 50% chance to earn kn 900 and a 50% chance to lose kn 900
 b. I do not want further gains or losses
You’ve just lost kn 3000. Choose one of the two options offered:
 a. 50% chance to earn kn 900 and a 50% chance to lose kn 900
 b. I do not want further gains or losses
You’ve just lost kn 3000. Choose one of the two options offered:
 a. 33% chance to earn kn 3000 and 67% to earn kn 0
 b. safe earning of kn 1000
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Age group you belong to:
less than 30 years
 a. 31-40 years
 b. 41-50 years
 c. 51-60 years
 d. over 60 years
Your education:
 a. related to finance
 b. related to business
 c. other
Professionally you are (or have been) in contact with the 
financial markets through:
 a. employment in a financial institution as a broker
 b. employment in a financial institution as a financial 
  analyst
 c. employment in a financial institution as a portfolio / 
  fund manager
 d. employment in a financial institutions as a board 
  member
 e. employment in a financial institutions as an 
  investment advisor to clients Private Banking / 
  Wealth Management
 f. employment in the central bank, the CDA, the ZSE
 g. employment in the treasury of a company
 h. media coverage of financial markets
 i. so far I have never had professional contacts with 
  financial markets
 j. something else
How long do you invest in stocks/trade (or other financial 
instruments, such as bonds or financial derivatives) on your 
own account?
 a. more than 5 years
 b. 1-5 years
 c. less than 1 year
 d. I do not invest / trade
How often do you invest in stocks/trade stocks (or other fi-
nancial instruments, such as bonds or financial derivatives) 
on your own account?
 a. at least one day
 b. at least once a week
 c. at least once a month
 d. at least once a quarter
 e. at least once a year
How many stocks (or other financial instruments, such as 
bonds or financial derivatives) are there in your portfolio?
 a. less than 3
 b. from 3-10
 c. more than 10

